Turkish protest：The Historical Evolution of Turkey’s Struggle Between Religion and Secularism

On March 19, Turkish police arrested Ekrem İmamoğlu, mayor of Turkey’s largest city, Istanbul, a key leader of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the primary political rival of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

This sparked a wave of protests across major Turkish cities. The CHP, other opposition parties—primarily left-wing—liberals opposing authoritarianism, university students, and many citizens took to the streets in Istanbul and across Turkey to protest Erdoğan and his government’s arrest of an opposition leader, their undermining of democracy, and their monopolization of power in a dictatorial manner. The protests have grown in scale and intensity over the past few days, with over a thousand people reportedly injured and more than a thousand arrested, yet there are no signs of them subsiding.

This protest is not only a reaction to the increasing authoritarianism and shrinking space for opposition under Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) but also another eruption of Turkey’s long-standing tensions and struggles between secularism and religion, progressivism and conservatism, and urban and rural divides.

The Historical Background: From the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey

The region that is now the Republic of Turkey has been ruled by various empires throughout history, with the Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire and the Ottoman Empire being the most long-lasting and influential. During the Ottoman period, Turkey gradually became Islamized, with the vast majority of its population converting to Islam. Compared to the Arabian Peninsula, Turkey had a lower degree of religious fundamentalism and retained some elements of Christian and secular culture from its Byzantine and Greek-influenced past. However, Islam remained the dominant force.

During World War I, the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers alongside Germany and Austria-Hungary, fighting against the Allies, including Britain, France, and Russia. By 1918, the Central Powers were on the brink of defeat. Britain, France, Russia, and Greece sought to partition and weaken Turkey. At this critical moment for national survival, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his Turkish National Forces launched the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1923), successfully repelling Greek forces, deterring the British and French, and stabilizing internal unrest. This forced the Allies to revise their peace terms significantly. Although the Ottoman Empire was dismantled, and its colonies lost, the core territory of Turkey was preserved.

Amidst the national turmoil, the Ottoman Sultan (Emperor) abdicated, and the Caliph (the highest religious leader) was also deposed. In 1923, Atatürk and his allies—mainly military officers—founded the Republic of Turkey, with Atatürk serving as its first president. He also established the Republican People’s Party (CHP) as the ruling party to implement his vision and policies.

Atatürk’s Secular Reforms and Their Impact

After taking office, Atatürk, deeply aware of Turkey’s historical poverty and weakness, the decline of the Ottoman monarchy, and the disparity between Turkey and the Western powers, launched a series of sweeping reforms. These included expanding education, science, and industry, replacing Arabic script with the Latin alphabet, and adopting Westernization policies. At the same time, he promoted Turkish nationalism to unite the people and abolished Islam’s status as the state religion, weakening religious influence while advancing secularization and granting women equal rights.

These measures eradicated many outdated traditions and inefficiencies, facilitating Turkey’s modernization, economic growth, and national strength. Major cities like Istanbul gradually developed secular communities where people were either non-religious or had a more relaxed approach to faith. Atatürk and his Turkish National Army were the cornerstone of the republic’s foundation and the most secularized group in Turkey. Additionally, university faculty and students, as well as judicial professionals, were two other highly secularized groups that Atatürk deliberately nurtured and relied upon. The military, universities, and judiciary became the three key pillars defending Turkish secularism and republicanism.

However, a significant portion of the Turkish population—including Islamic clergy, elites affiliated with the former Ottoman Empire, rural landowners, and peasants—remained deeply influenced by Islamic traditions and were devout Muslims. After all, the Ottoman Empire had maintained Islam as its state religion for over 600 years, and the power of the religious establishment was deeply ingrained in society.

During Atatürk’s lifetime, his personal prestige, the military’s coercive power, the ruling CHP’s political monopoly, and his iron-fisted policies ensured the dominance of secularism. Religious conservatives remained largely silent. However, after Atatürk’s death in 1938, various religious conservative forces began to stir. As Turkey gradually embraced democratization and universal suffrage, religious conservatives repeatedly gained electoral victories and attempted to overturn secular republicanism in favor of re-establishing a theocratic system—or at least a state where religion played a guiding role.

The Turkish military, as the staunchest defender of Kemalism (secularism, republicanism, and progressivism), repeatedly intervened through coups whenever religious conservatives came to power via democratic means and attempted to dismantle secular institutions. Each time, they dissolved religious conservative parties and other extreme left- and right-wing factions, ensuring that the center-left CHP maintained authoritarian control to safeguard the secular republic.

For a long time, religious conservatives in Turkey were the democratic faction, while secularists were the authoritarian faction. Religious conservatives had the support of the majority population and dominated elections but were often kept from power. Meanwhile, secular republicanism and progressivism were supported primarily by the military, intellectual elites, and urban middle classes. However, these groups maintained dominance by controlling key institutions and the highest levels of power.

The Latest Protests and Turkey’s Ongoing Struggle

The recent arrest of İmamoğlu and the ensuing protests mark yet another confrontation between secular progressives and religious conservatives, as well as another instance of Erdoğan using populist democracy and judicial overreach to suppress opposition. With Istanbul as the secular stronghold and İmamoğlu as a rising political star, his arrest has sparked widespread outrage.

Conversely, Erdoğan also sees İmamoğlu and the CHP’s major victory in the 2024 local elections—where the CHP not only gained control of most major cities but also surpassed the AKP in total nationwide votes—as a significant threat. This was the first time in over 20 years that the AKP lost to a single opposition party in a national vote, prompting Erdoğan to order İmamoğlu’s arrest.

The timing of the arrest coincides with the CHP’s primary election to nominate its candidate for the 2028 presidential race. Despite İmamoğlu’s detention, the CHP still nominated him as their presidential candidate on March 23, signaling their defiance and refusal to recognize the judicial process as legitimate. The active participation of university students in the protests also reflects the enduring influence of Atatürk’s secular legacy. Unless İmamoğlu is released, the protests are unlikely to subside in the near future.

Many view this wave of protests as a democratic struggle against dictatorship, and given Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies, personality cult, and the AKP’s political monopoly, this perspective is understandable.

However, the deeper issue lies in the fundamental ideological and political divide between Turkey’s secular progressives and religious conservatives. It is a reflection of the deep schism between urban and rural populations, the century-long struggle between secular modernization and entrenched religious traditions, and the broader lesson of how democracy in developing countries can succumb to populism, majoritarian tyranny, and religious conservatism. And these critical yet often overlooked issues are not unique to Turkey.